In this paper I attempt to do three things.
Finally, I will discuss various issues related to the processes involved in the comprehension of metaphors. Along the way I shall make a few observations about the relationship between metaphors and meaning.
Metaphor: The Standard Definition
The standard dictionary definition is that a metaphor is a word or phrase applied to an object or concept that it does not literally denote in order to suggest comparison with another object or concept. Assuming that it is possible to determine a satisfactory criterion for "literal denotation," this definition is, no doubt, adequate for the purposes of lexicographers. But, as we shall see, it is not adequate for the purposes of psychologists or theoretical linguists. The cognitive psychologist might be concerned with when and why people use metaphors, and when and how they understand them. He/she is concerned with the processes presumed to underlie their use and comprehension, and how, if at all, these processes differ from and are related to those involved in literal uses of language. The linguist might be concerned with the formal properties of metaphors and the semantic and pragmatic relations that they have to their literal counterparts. The
Aspects of Metaphor 2 linguist might also be interested in syntactic relations as they pertain to certain kinds of figurative language. None of these interests is well served by the standard dictionary definition.
The standard dictionary definition of metaphor seems to underlie many of the discussions provided by those working in the various disciplines concerned with it. For example, to the extent that metaphor has received serious consideration in linguistics, theoreticians have tended to try to account for it in terms of selection restriction violations. A good example of such an approach can be found in Matthews (1971) , who makes two claims of particular interest. One is that the presence of a selection restriction violation is "a necessary and sufficient condition for the distinguishing of metaphor from non-metaphor." The second is that the effect of such a violation is to "de-emphasize the features which figure in [it] as well as those other features most closely associated with it" (p. 424).
Within the limiting machinery of selection restrictions Matthews makes a reasonable case for his conclusions. The root of the problem lies in his uncritical acceptance of a theory of semantic features and all that is implied by it.
The shortcomings of the feature approach to semantics have been discussed at length both in linguistics and psychology, and Matthews himself admits that semantic features are not assumed to be either psychologically or physically real. But even if one were willing to accept feature theory and the gratuitous ad hoc features that it entails, still there would be two grave difficulties to overcome. First, one would be unable to account for a whole class of metaphors in this way. Second, one would in any case be able to (1) is not a metaphor even though uttered about a decrepit professor emeritus.
(1) The old rock is becoming brittle with age.
He argues that underlying (1) is a "real" metaphor, (2):
(2) The old professor emeritus is a rock.
But this seems to beg the question. Clearly, if (1) is uttered in the appropriate context it cannot be interpreted literally in any intelligible way, so there is no basis for arguing that in such a context (1) is not a metaphor.
It is true that it may imply or presuppose other metaphors such as (2), but that is not a sufficient reason for denying that (1) is, or at least can be, a metaphor.
The second problem concerns some of the consequences of the view that the violation of a selection restriction is a necessary and sufficient condition for something's being a metaphor. If this is the case there would seem to be no way to distinguish between a metaphor and a semantic anomaly Reddy says it is. Perhaps the only thing implied by a speaker's "curious and unconventional" choice of words is that the speaker was unable to express his intentions in any other way. One would hardly suppose, however, that the meaning of (4) in a context like (5) was the speaker's inability to express himself otherwise. On the other hand, it does seem to suppose that a hearer's recognition of the curious choice of words may sometimes justify, or even trigger a nonliteral interpretation of them. Furthermore, it probably is the case that the metaphorical meaning of an utterance such as (4), is indeed related to certain implications of it, albeit not those that Reddy has in mind.
I would argue that the metaphorical meaning of a whole-sentence metaphor like (4) in a context such as (5) has to be related to those salient components of its literal meaning that do not conflict with the context, and some of these are implications of the literal meaning. For example, one of the implications of the literal meaning of (4) is that a
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group of people continued doing what they were already doing without concern for the consequences. Another is that the probable consequences were undesirable, another that the people were aware of this, but stubbornly unconcerned, and so on.
The utilization, in comprehension, of those salient aspects of literal meaning that do not conflict with the context, is consistent with the account of the comprehension of part-sentence metaphors such as (6) that I have proposed in an earlier paper (Ortony, 1975) .
(6) The boy dived into the crowd.
All metaphors give rise to what is usually called metaphorical tension which
is a result of the conceptual incompatibility inherent in a metaphor taken in its context. The comprehension of the metaphor requires the elimination of the tension, that is, the elimination of aspects of the meaning of words, phrases or sentences that when interpreted literally give rise to tension.
Metaphor: An Alternative Definition
Having found the standard account wanting, the question arises as to whether or not a superior, alternative account can be offered. What I
propose to do now is to try to offer such an account. A first requirement for something to be a metaphor is that it should be pragmatically, or perhaps better, contextually anomalous. This means that a literal interpretation of the expression, be it a word, phrase, sentence, or an even larger unit of text, fails to fit the context. The virtue of this requirement is that it permits the classification of one and the same expression as being a metaphor in some cases and not in others.
A corollary
Aspects of Metaphor 9 is that it is not linguistic expressions themselves that are metaphors, but particular uses of them. Thus, whether or not (4) is a metaphor depends upon the context in which it is used; and, as we have seen, this is as it should be. The contextual anomaly condition also permits the inclusion of expressions like (6), since insofar as it expresses something that is literally impossible, there can be no normal context in which it will fit unless it is interpreted metaphorically. There may, however, be "abnormal" or magical contexts that will support a literal interpretation of such part-sentence metaphors, and to the extent that there are, tokens of such expressions will not be metaphors. Alice in Wonderland is full of superficially anomalous sentences that can be interpreted literally because of the bizarreness of the contexts in which they occur.
The general point that needs to be emphasized here is that if something is a metaphor then it will be contextually anomalous if interpreted literally (except in rare cases of ambiguous expressions wherein one reading makes sense literally and the other metaphorically, in which case the generalization is still true of the latter reading We now have two conditions for something's being a metaphor, which, if taken conjointly seem to be necessary and sufficient. The first is the contextual anomaly condition, the second is that the metaphorical tension should in principle be eliminable. We should probably introduce a third condition, or at least, a caveat, that makes reference to the speaker's intentions and his or her expectations about their recognition. For example, one might require that the speaker intend to speak metaphorically,
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and that in order to do so he or she must believe that the tension elimination condition holds, and probably also that the contextual anomaly condition holds. Presumably, the speaker must further believe, or at least expect, that the hearer will recognize these beliefs. If a speaker does not hold such beliefs, whereas he might produce a metaphor inadvertently, in the sense that a hearer might recognize that the two conditions hold, nevertheless, the hearer will wrongly attribute to the speaker certain communicative intentions that were never there, and communication may break down as a consequence. The role of intentions in language production in general is a very complex issue and one whose detailed treatment lies well beyond the scope of the present paper. However it may well be that one has to settle for a rather weak conception of intention. An operational account of such a weak notion of intention might merely require that a speaker be willing to agree that he or she had such an intention after the fact, rather than postulating a specific intention as a causal component of the behavior Ortony, 1978; Ortony, in press ).
I want now to enlarge somewhat on the theoretical basis of my revised definition of a metaphor, namely, that a metaphor is the use of an expression that is contextually anomalous and for which the metaphoric tension is in principle eliminable. Consider first the contextual anomaly requirement.
In his classic paper on Logic and Conversation, Grice (1975) proposes that human linguistic communication is governed by what he calls the Cooperative Principle; a principle that reflects the fact that conversations normally take place against a background of speaker and hearer expectations to cooperate in communication.
The Cooperative Principle comprises a number of maxims: "Make your contribution as informative as required," "Try to make your contribution one that is true," "Be relevant"
and "Be perspicuous." In order to achieve adequate generalizability it appears necessary to modify and extend some of Grice's original formulations. Following the terminology of Gordon and Lakoff (1975) governs not only the truth of assertions, but the felicity of promises, the genuineness of orders, and so on. The second postulate of concern to us is the relevance postulate which is the same as Grice's maxim "Be relevant."
Conversations would not be conversations were there to be no relevance connections between adjacent parts; in the same way, it is presumably the case that such relevance relations also distinguish a text from a random collection of sentences.
One of the chief points that emerges from Grice's paper is that while conversational postulates frequently appear to be violated, these violations are usually only apparent, and they occur often for very good reasons.
Another way of making this point is to observe that speakers very rarely opt out of the Cooperative Principle. This means that when a hearer encounters If such an account were to be translated into a processing model, the comprehension of metaphors would be characterized by there first being a recognition of the violation of the two postulates followed by a process that rendered those violations only apparent, and that process, as I have already suggested, would be the process of tension elimination, to be discussed in a moment. However, I rather doubt that this model will cover even the majority of cases. The three aspects of metaphor represented by the inexpressibility thesis, the compactness thesis, and the vividness thesis all relate to the process of tension elimination. When the woman describes her husband as a teddy bear the tension arises as a result of the incompatibility of the humanness of her husband and the non-humanness of teddy bears. Tension elimination is achieved by ignoring those salient aspects or attributes of teddy bears that are perceived as being incompatible with husbands. In this particular example the attributes are such things as "being a toy." In the general case the attributes can be much more complex and may not even be easily representable in the language. Certainly they are not restricted in the way that semantic features are (see Ortony, 1978) . What I am proposing is that when these attributes have been eliminated the remaining salient attributes of the vehicle are attributed as a whole, that is, an entire cognitive substructure is mapped onto the topic. By predicating the nonconflicting attributes en masse the articulation of discrete predicates is not required, nor even is a conscious recognition of them. This clearly achieves compactness. It might also achieve vividness and greater imageability since holistic representations of this kind might be closer to perceptual representations than a set of abstracted predicates articulated through the medium of language. The matter is, however, rather more complicated since the tension elimination process might be different under different circumstances 2 .
It is often said that metaphors are (intended to suggest) comparisons.
The account offered here suggests that the role of comparison is in the tension elimination process. Undoubtedly some metaphors are intended by their authors to focus on shared characteristics between the topic and the vehicle, but others may be intended as a way of expressing what is literally inexpressible, or as a way of causing the hearer to see things in new ways.
Sometimes, therefore, comparison may be better regarded as the means of comprehension rather than the purpose of it.
Metaphor: Some Issues Concerning Comprehension
The psychological implications of a Cricean approach to metaphor seem clear enough.
In his/her effort after meaning, a hearer may recognize that something is contextually anomalous and that it cannot be sensibly literally For example, an experiment reported in Ortony, Schallert, Reynolds, and Antos (1978) was designed to investigate the question of whether or not metaphors (always) take longer to understand than comparable literal uses of language, as seems to be predicted by the Gricean account. Accordingly, we tried to determine whether sentences that followed a context which induced their literal interpretations would be comprehended more rapidly than those same sentences following contexts that induced metaphorical interpretations.
We also wanted to determine whether the amount of context was a factor. We therefore collected reaction times to understanding sentences while varying the type and length of preceding context. In a second experiment we used a similar procedure to look at performance on idioms.
It was hypothesized that with familiar idioms comprehension would be as quick as, if not quicker than, comprehension of those same expressions interpreted literally.
Results of the first experiment showed a strong main effect for length of context; targets following long contexts took much less time to understand than did targets following short contexts. Thus, for example, a sentence like (7) as it appears in a context like (8) took significantly less time to understand than if the context segment were shortened to include only the first sentence of (8).
(7) The fabric had begun to fray Aspects of Metaphor 20 (8) Lucy and Phil needed a marriage councelor. They had once been very happy but after several years of marriage they had become discontented with one another. Little habits which had at first been endearing were now irritating and caused many senseless and heated arguments. The fabric had begun to fray.
There was also a strong main effect for type of context wherein targets following contexts inducing a metaphorical interpretation (like (7) in the context of (8)) took significantly longer to understand than did targets following literal inducing contexts (like (7) in the context of (9)).
(9) The old couch needed reupholstering. After two generations of wear, the edges of the couch were tattered and soiled. Several buttons were missing and the material around the seems was beginning to unravel. The upholstery had become very shabby.
The fabric had begun to fray.
Finally, and perhaps most interesting, was the significant interaction between context type and context length. The difference between literals and metaphors was greater for short contexts (4419 and 3616 msec, respectively) than for long ones (2141 and 1910 msec, respectively Ortony, 1978 .)
The psychological study of metaphor is still very much in its infancy.
It is not an easy area to investigate. Even if we get satisfactory answers to all the questions currently being addressed, there are many and difficult ones remaining. I shall conclude by making a few observations on just one of them, namely, the relationship between metaphors and similes.
No adequate theory of metaphor can ignore the difference between metaphor and simile. When the woman says of her husband that he is a teddy bear, she uses a metaphor; when she says of him that he is like a teddy bear, she uses a simile. Traditionally the distinction between metaphor and simile has been made in terms of the distinction between an implicit comparison (metaphor) and an explicit comparison (simile), the latter typically being marked by the presence of "like" or "as."
In terms of the analysis that I have offered, it might seem that there is an important difference between metaphors and similes because the apparent violation, at least of the sincerity postulate, is immediately obvious in the case of the metaphor, but much less obvious for the simile. Thus, it is presumably false that the woman's husband is a teddy bear, but is it so obvious that he is not like one? Unless one takes "like" to mean "like in all respects" it Aspects of Metaphor 23 would seem that there are respects in which he is like a teddy bear so that (10) and (11) would appear to have the same truth value.
(10) My husband is like a teddy bear.
(11) My husband is like a teddy bear in some respects.
(12) My husband is a teddy bear.
Since, in some respects, almost everything is like almost everything else, it would seem to follow that under normal circumstances of use, (10) and (11) are true, and if they are both true, they are both literal uses of language, and one might then ask why it is that similes should be discussed in the same context as metaphors at all since the corresponding metaphor, (12), is presumably false. This possibility, that similes are in fact literal uses of language, rather naturally leads to the kind of analysis Kintsch offers. One could argue that since a hearer knows that the metaphorical statement, (12), is literally false he attempts to construct a simile such as (10) from it. The answer, I think, is the one that I discuss in Ortony (1978; Ortony, in press) , namely that for genuine similes 3 considered literally, there are no shared salient properties .
If this is the case, one might then go on to argue that in fact (10) is false, and that (11) is only trivially true; that is, the respects in which the two terms are similar are trivial, irrelevant respects. This would be one reasonable way to try to reinstate the relevance of similes to metaphors. There are others.
Aspects of Metaphor have argued, it may be impossible for them to say what they mean within the constraints of a particular language. Implicit in my remarks has been the notion that in the general case the meaning of an utterance is related to its implications, or some of them. In the case of nonliteral uses of language, many of these are inappropriate and have to be discarded. It may well be that in terms of a theory of meaning, the distinction between literal and nonliteral uses of language is based on a difference of degree rather than anything else. That is, it may well be that some utterances are more metaphorical than others. Such a conclusion seems quite innocuous and is certainly compatible with the notion that the extreme cases might involve different kinds of cognitive processes.
INotice that we are better able to appeal to a violation of our more general sincerity postulate than we are to Grice's truth maxim, for since there are as yet no established referents for any of the substantive terms in (4), the truth value of (4) is presumably undetermined. Notice also how the question of truth is assessed relative to the context, as must be the question of sincerity in general.
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For example, suppose one distinguishes between metaphors which are based on known similarities and metaphors which require the discovery of new similarities.
In the case of a metaphor based on known similarities no new knowledge will be acquired as a result of its comprehension. In such cases it may well be that comprehension is achieved not by attribute rejection but by attribute selection.
Actually, this claim is rather oversimplified. There may be shared properties in similes, but where there are, these properties have subtle but important differences in the different domains of the two terms.
